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I. Introduction  
The proposal of reparations to African-Americans for slavery 
and subsequent offenses has stimulated a great deal of academic at-
tention but little practical action.   One reason for this is the indiffer-
ence of non-black Americans and the lack of historical consciousness 
in a pragmatic, forward-looking culture.  Yet some African-
Americans also have mixed feelings about reparations, preferring to 
concentrate on current problems rather than seek repayment for past 
 
 1. Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School.  A. B., Cornell, 1977.  J.D., Yale, 1981.  The 
author thanks Leora Bilsky, Philip Harvey, Stacy Hawkins and Assaf Likhovski for 
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. 
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wrongs, and perhaps even considering the debate as a divergence 
from more pressing, immediate problems. 
While the debate about reparations has flickered, two related but 
distinct developments have taken place.   The first involves a growing 
awareness of continuing discrimination against African-Americans. 
The most dramatic example of which is the mass incarceration of 
black males that is frequently for behavior bearing a dubious relation-
ship to the penalties imposed.2   This development is significant be-
cause it suggests that the mistreatment of African-Americans is an 
ongoing and growing phenomenon, not just a past injustice, that the 
mistreatment may actually be growing while the discussion takes 
place, and that it is time for the injustices to be compensated. While 
this development arguably strengthens the case for reparations, it also 
makes them more difficult to obtain, since a full accounting would 
require not only confronting the past but also making substantial 
changes in contemporary public policy. 
 Second, while the reparations debate continues a substantial 
literature has emerged alternative forms of redress for genocide and 
other historical injustices.  Organized loosely around the term “re-
storative justice,” this literature emphasizes apology, institutional 
memory, and a complete and systematic factual accounting in place 
of more traditional methods such as criminal punishment and finan-
cial remuneration.3  This development is likewise important, because 
it suggests that conventional reparations may not be the only or even 
the best form of redress for politically controversial wrongs.  The 
concept is not purely theoretical. Restorative justice has been at-
tempted, with varying degrees of success, in South Africa, the former 
Soviet Union, and other countries, some of which face issues such as 
continuing discrimination, a rhetoric of innocence, and fear of the po-
litical ramifications of reparation payments that is broadly reminis-
cent of the American situation. 
 This essay considers the reparations issue in light of the devel-
opments above, while examining a series of books published or re-
published in the last decade.  The texts examined include: one work 
which summarizes the traditional reparation arguments (Brophy), two 
 
 2. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS, THE NEW PRESS, 1-6 (2010); ALICE GOFFMAN, ON THE RUN: 
FUGITIVE LIFE IN AN AMERICAN CITY, THE UNIV. OF CHICAGO PRESS (2014). 
 3. See infra text accompanying notes 17-27. 
LIVINGSTON_ARTICLE 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/8/17  12:40 PM 
2016- 2017             UB Journal of International Law                Vol. V. No. 1 
 44 
books primarily concerned with mass incarceration (Alexander and 
Goffman), two collections devoted to restorative justice (Barkan and 
Johnstone), and two books that implicate Stalin’s crimes and efforts 
to address them in the former Soviet Union (Conquest and Kotkin).4    
I am aware that the combination of these subjects, especially the 
subject of the last two books, is somewhat unconventional in nature. 
To the extent that it considers foreign countries at all, the reparation 
debate has typically focused on the European Holocaust and perhaps 
South Africa, while Russia, China, or similar places seemingly far 
removed from the question at hand.    Yet the very novelty of such 
comparisons makes them especially productive. Many of the issues 
that complicate American reparations turn out to be surprisingly 
common, and the experience of other countries provides useful in-
sights into approaches that are promising and approaches that are best 
avoided. 
 This essay proceeds topically, with the aforementioned texts 
appearing and reappearing as the discussion progresses.  Part One 
summarizes the reparations debate and the usual arguments for and 
against the proposal.5   Part Two addresses the mass incarceration is-
sue and its implications for the reparations problem.6  Part Three in-
troduces the restorative justice concept and its application in real-
world situations, including South Africa and (with rather less suc-
cess) the former Soviet Union.7   Part Four discusses the Russian ex-
ample further, including its many, however imperfect, parallels to the 
contemporary American situation.8   Part Five incorporates the au-
thor’s conclusions and suggestions for future research. 9   
 Because this is a review essay rather than a standard article, 
some of the more persuasive arguments may appear later, while some 
of the earlier points may strike readers as unconvincing.   The practi-
cal viability of reparations, which is discussed in the latter sections, 
may strike some readers as logically prior to more theoretical con-
cerns.  Those readers finding themselves impatient are encouraged to 
skip ahead, and return to the prior sections if they so desire.  
 
 4. See infra text accompanying notes 42-43. 
 5. See infra text accompanying notes 22-30. 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 27-31.  
 7. See infra text accompanying notes 31-44.  
 8. See infra text accompanying notes 43-44. 
 9. See infra text accompanying note 45 and following. 
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II. The reparations debate: politically daring, philosophically 
conventional 
 Although the case for reparations is politically daring, in a le-
gal sense it is actually rather conventional, proceeding from the as-
sumption that slavery produced a large economic surplus for which 
the slaves were not compensated.  This is often supplemented by the 
argument that even after slavery African-Americans continued to be 
denied the fruits of their labor under the black codes, Jim Crow laws, 
and similar arrangements.10 From a jurisprudential perspective, these 
arguments are similar to those made in other reparation cases, includ-
ing several in North America (Native Americans, Japanese-
Americans, etc.) and a larger number in other countries.  The legal 
barriers to reparation claims, including sovereign immunity, statutes 
of limitations, and a range of technical problems—whom to compen-
sate, how much, and who should be responsible to pay them—are 
likewise similar to those in other cases.11 
 Alfred Brophy’s book, Reparations: Pro and Con (2006), pro-
vides a useful summary of the relevant arguments, together with a 
brief history of the movement’s successes and failures in recent dec-
ades.   While generally sympathetic to reparations, he includes a rea-
sonable list of opposing viewpoints, including the supposed absence 
of moral or legal liability; the notion that compensation has already 
been paid by means of affirmative action, welfare, and other govern-
ment programs; and the politically divisive nature of reparation 
claims.12   The book is a summary, rather than a new analysis, and 
most of the positive arguments (Charles Ogletree, Mari Matsuda) and 
opposing viewpoints (notably David Horowitz) have appeared else-
where. Regardless, it is an unusually fair treatment, and provides a 
helpful bridge between the theoretical and the practical side of analy-
sis13 
 
 10. ALFRED BROPHY, REPARATIONS: PRO CON OXFORD UNIV. PRESS (2006). 
 11. See generally, BROPHY, supra note 10(describing the arguments for and against repara-
tions); Symposium, The Jurisprudence of Slavery Reparations, 84 B.U.L. REV. 1139 
(2004) (discussing more arguments on reparation). 
 12. BROPHY, supra note 10, at 55-96. 
 13. See CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR.  REPAIRING THE PAST: NEW EFFORTS IN THE 
REPARATIONS DEBATE IN AMERICA, 38 HARV CIV. RTS. -CIV. LIB. L. REV. 279 (2003); 
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 While primarily focused on African-Americans, Reparations: 
Pro and Con denotes the payment of reparations to Japanese-
Americans and (in limited cases) Native American tribes, as well as 
the European Holocaust and South Africa cases.14   The author recog-
nizes the trend toward apology, truth commissions, and so forth but 
appears to regard these trends primarily as intermediate steps on the 
way toward reparations.15   The book also includes a lengthy discus-
sion of practical issues in reparations litigation, including the identifi-
cation of victims and the establishment of a sufficient nexus between 
the victims and the alleged harm.16 
 Since Brophy’s book emerged, there has been a revival of in-
terest in reparations, spurred by positive energy and, in part, by frus-
tration with the persistence of racial inequality, notwithstanding the 
election of a black President and the supposed dawn of a new, “post-
racial” era.17  The most popular expression of this sentiment was a 
June 2014 edition article published in The Atlantic magazine by Ta-
Nehisi Coates, a journalist and social critic, with the deceptively sim-
ple title, “The Case For Reparations.”18   Rather than philosophy, 
Coates emphasizes the real-world experience of African-Americans, 
beginning with a man (Clyde Ross) who migrated from Mississippi to 
Chicago only to see his home redlined by mortgage bankers and his 
neighborhood delineate from middle class status to extreme poverty19  
Using this story as a focal point, Coates re-tells American history as a 
story of white wealth financed in large part by black plunder, while 
describing previous efforts at compensation, including affirmative ac-
 
MARI MATSUDA, LOOKING TO THE BOTTOM: CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES AND 
REPARATIONS, 22 HARV. CIV. RTS. -CIV. LIB. L. REV. 323 (1987); DAVID HOROWITZ, 
UNCIVIL WARS: THE CONTROVERSY OVER REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY (2001). 
 14. BROPHY, supra note 25, at 19-54. 
 15. BROPHY, supra note 25, at 11-16. 
 16. BROPHY, supra note 10, at 97-166. 
 17. On the Obama Administration and the limits of post-racialism, see BREANNA M. 
BACON, THE MYTH OF OBAMA’S POST-RACIAL PRESIDENCY: WHY BARACK OBAMA’S 
ELECTION DIDN’T END RACIAL INEQUALITY IN AMERICA, INQUIRIES J. vol.2,7, 
http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/988/the-myth-of-obamas-post-racial-
presidency-why-barack-obamas-election-didnt-end-racial-inequality-in-america 
(2015).  
 18. Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, THE ATLANTIC (Jun. 2014) 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-
reparations/361631/. 
 19. COATES, supra note 18, at Part I.  
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tion, as either inadequate or disingenuous in nature.20 “Reparations,” 
Coates concludes, “by which I mean the full acceptance of our collec-
tive biography and its consequences __is the price we must pay to see 
ourselves squarely.”21 
 Although attracting less public attention, the past few decades 
have also been witness to a number of symposia, individual articles, 
and other academic treatments of the reparations issue, some of them 
generic in character and others specific to African-American claims.   
For example, Hanoch Dagan argued in a 2004 symposium that resti-
tution for slavery is consistent with existing principles of unjust en-
richment, and that neither the difficulty of identifying specific victims 
nor the fact that slavery was “legal” at the time the harms were in-
flicted need serve as a barrier to successful claims.22  By contrast, 
Emily Sherwin argued that these and other problems make a claim 
for unjust enrichment unconvincing, although Sherwin did not rule 
out the possibility of claims based on alternate legal theories.23 Other 
scholars have addressed the issue from the perspective, inter alia, of 
tort law, economic redistribution, and the history of previous repara-
tion claims.24  While these scholars disagree on numerous points, 
their work makes clear that slavery reparations are not merely a polit-
ical cause, but are a legal argument with strong precedents both in 
academic theory and previous historical practice. 
 To the extent that scholars cite a precedent for reparations, it is 
most frequently the European Holocaust (1941-45), which killed six 
million Jews and numerous others, resulting in a series of reparation 
payments made by the Federal Republic of Germany from the 1950s 
on.25    The Holocaust precedent carries enormous moral weight, but 
can be something of a two-edge sword, since there is a tendency to 
 
 20. COATES, supra note 18, at Parts II-VIII.  
 21. COATES, supra note 18 at Part IX.  
 22. HANOCH DAGAN, RESTITUTION AND SLAVERY, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1139 (2004). 
 23. EMILY SHERWIN, REPARATIONS AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1443 
(2004) 
 24. See generally Symposium: The Jurisprudence of Reparations, B.U. L. REV.  84 (2004). 
 25. See generally, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS (1961); SAUL 
FRIEDLANDER, NAZI GERMANY AND THE JEWS, VOLUME TWO: THE YEARS OF 
EXTERMINATION HARPER PERENNIAL (2007) l, ISRAEL GUTMAN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
HOLOCAUST MACMILLIAN (1990). (The literature on the Holocaust is vast. Hilberg’s 
book is classic first generation treatment. Friedlander and Gutman’s works are both re-
spected recent treatments).  
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regard it as a unique event. People sometimes distinguish the Holo-
caust from slavery because it involved murder rather than enslave-
ment, and because reparations were paid quickly after the event, ra-
ther than after a substantial lapse of time.   Each of these arguments 
can be overstated: Holocaust reparations were in theory for lost prop-
erty rather than lives, and the oppression of African-Americans con-
tinued well after 1865, making the lapse of time may be less of a fac-
tor than first appears.  A more significant practical difference may be 
that Germany was defeated in 1945, and faced political pressures to 
accommodate Jewish victims as well as other victims, a precedent 
that cannot be easily applied to America.    Still, the Holocaust re-
mains the universal paradigm for human rights abuses, and will likely 
continue to be cited by both sides of the aisle for the foreseeable fu-
ture, in spite of its relevance.26 
 The Brophy text, the Coates article, and various academic 
treatments provide a welcome range of opinions on the reparations 
problem.   But it is hard to escape the feeling that the debate is circu-
lar, with the two sides converging only slowly and perhaps moving 
further apart.   Specifically, three problems present themselves. 
 First, the debate is largely an internal one, pitting mainstream 
liberals against “progressives” or “radicals” who believe that liberal 
policies regarding race have failed and that a stronger prescription is 
required.   Unlike (say) the debate over the Confederate flag, which 
crosses party lines, it is hard to think of many conservatives or even 
moderates who take the debate very seriously.   That doesn’t mean 
reparations is wrong—no one expected gay marriage to win such 
widespread support so quickly; but after a generation of debate one 
could hope for a wider audience, or at least a wider range of opinions 
on the subject. 
 
 26. On the uses and (sometimes) abuses of the Holocaust, see, e.g., BEREL LANG, THE 
FUTURE OF THE HOLOCAUST: BETWEEN HISTORY AND MEMORY CORNELL PRESS (1999); 
ALVIN ROSENFELD, THE END OF THE HOLOCAUST INDIANA UNIV. PRESS (2011); 
MICHAEL NOVICK, THE HOLOCAUST IN AMERICAN LIFE HOUGHTON MIFFLIN (2000).For 
a critical treatment of the use of the Holocaust in Israel, see IDIT ZERTAL, ISRAEL’S 
HOLOCAUST AND THE POLITICS OF NATIONHOOD (Hebrew Title: HA-UMAH 
VE’HAMAVET) CAMBRIDGE MIDDLE EAST STUDIES 21(2010).A somewhat more offbeat 
approach is JUDITH MILLER, ONE BY ONE BY ONE: THE LANDMARK EXPLANATION OF 
THE HOLOCAUST AND THE USES OF MEMORY SIMON & SCHUESTER (1991).   
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 Second, the debate seems oddly disconnected from current re-
alities. Successful reparations claims tend to involve what tax lawyers 
call “closed and completed” transactions; that is, situations in which 
the behavior complained of is finished and unlikely to repeat itself in 
the future. For example, most people doubt that Japanese-Americans 
will be interned again, or that Europe will have a second Holocaust.   
By contrast, today’s national news is filled with stories of violence or 
degradation involving African-Americans, from the case of Trayvon 
Martin to police shootings to poverty, to incarceration, and so forth.  
None of these events are meant to articulate that reparations are 
wrong or even unnecessary.    But it’s hard to build a case for com-
pensating past injustice while the injustice is continuing. It is a bit 
like a man offering to compensate his neighbor for a car accident and 
then plowing into the same neighbor on the commute to the court-
house.  Continuing discrimination also complicates the legal issues in 
reparation. Should payments be made to descendants of slaves, of Jim 
Crow-era blacks, or all African-Americans on the basis of ongoing or 
even future harm? 
 Finally, the reparations debate is sometimes too legalistic for 
its own good.   The imperative to condense everything into a legally 
cognizable claim—such-and-such plaintiffs, such-and-such defend-
ants, such-and-such formulas for determining the amount to be 
paid—threatens to “squeeze the juice” out of the proposal and forfeit 
much of its moral stature. Alternatives like apology, cultural compen-
sation, and simple factual accounting are frequently downgraded as 
lacking the “seriousness” of reparations or constituting a merely in-
termediate stage in its path.  Again, none of the issues discussed thus 
far are indicative that reparations are wrong, but the time has come to 
update the arguments in accordance with current realities. 
 
 
III. Mass incarceration and the problem of continuing harm 
 In the past two years, racial dialogue has been dominated by a 
series of violent events involving African-American victims.   The 
highest profile of these instances involved a series of killings of un-
armed black men by police, including Michael Brown, Eric Garner, 
Tamir Rice or by neighborhood watch security guards, like Trayvon 
Martin, all in situations where the danger posed to the victims was at 
very least subject to questioning.  These events were followed by the 
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killing of nine unarmed victims by a young white supremacist in 
Charleston, South Carolina, an event which triggered the removal of 
the Confederate flag from the South Carolina and Alabama state 
houses and sprung a national debate on Confederate symbols in gen-
eral.   Many observers suggested that these were not random events, 
but rather a part of a pattern of white violence against African-
American citizens. 
 Some observers have suggested that police violence is not 
merely systematic in nature, but represents a continuation of patterns 
established in the slavery and Jim Crow eras.   In her book The New 
Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, 
Michelle Alexander argues that the mass incarceration of African-
American males, which originated in the 1980s-era “war on drugs,” 
has numerous characteristics in common with the Jim Crow era. 
Commonalties include the criminalization and incarceration of a sub-
stantial portion of the black community (especially young black 
males), the use of discriminatory legislation and enforcement tactics 
so that African-Americans are disproportionately punished for broad-
er societal ills, and the creation of a racial caste system between both 
whites and blacks and, to some degree, within the black community.     
Alexander strongly suggests that this pattern is not accidental, 
but part of an intentional strategy of subjugating African-Americans 
following the early successes of the Civil Rights movement.  Alexan-
der is especially hard on white liberals, noting that President Clinton 
signed legislation resulting in a record number of incarcerations, and 
(to an only slightly lesser degree) the black middle class, whom she 
suggests have effectively abandoned poor blacks in pursuit of other 
goals.27   Alexander’s book created a huge sensation, drawing de-
scriptions like s “explosive,” “devastating,” and “classic.”   The book 
is not without its critics—one reviewer asserted, inter alia, that it 
misstated the historical origins of mass incarceration, ignored class 
distinctions, and overlooked the experience of other minority 
groups—but even these critics are unable to deny the book’s intellec-
 
 27. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS NEW PRESS (2010).  
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tual impact, including the book’s ability to frame the debate on crim-
inal punishment, particularly as related to drug crimes.28 
 Moving from law to sociology is Alice Goffman’s book, On 
the Run: Fugitive Life in an American City.  Goffman, a white soci-
ologist, spent the better part of a decade living in a poor black neigh-
borhood of Philadelphia while describing what she saw. She focused 
on a group of young black men (“The Sixth Street Boys”) whose 
principle rites of passage centered around arrests, trial dates, and pa-
role hearings rather than graduations, parties, proms, and similar 
events usually associated with growing up.   While not idealizing her 
subjects—several were involved in robberies, shootouts, or other vio-
lent crimes—Goffman suggests that a significant percentage of the 
Sixth Street Boys legal problems arose from essentially procedural 
offenses (minor parole violations, failure to make court dates, etc.) or 
other behaviors like schoolyard fights and possession of small quanti-
ties of controlled substances. Offenses, she argues, that would almost 
certainly go unpunished in a white, suburban environment. 
Goffman’s book also describes a pattern of police harassment 
and violence against inner-city residents that frequently crossed the 
line from law enforcement procedure and protocol to something more 
reminiscent of an occupation force.29   In a TED talk delivered after 
the book’s publication, Goffman suggests that the criminal justice 
system has become a sort of alternative educational system for a sub-
stantial minority of the population, with predictably dire consequenc-
es.30 
Alexander’s and Goffman’s arguments have a contradictory ef-
fect on the reparations debate.   On one hand, the mass incarceration 
 
 28. See, JAMES FORMAN, JR., RACIAL CRITIQUES OF MASS INCARCERATION: BEYOND THE 
NEW JIM CROW, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101 (2012) (book review).  
 29. GOFFMAN, supra note 2. 
 30. See generally GIDEON LEWIS-KRAUSS, THE TRIALS OF ALICE GOFFMAN, N.Y. TIMES 
MAGAZINE, (Jan. 17, 2016). The principal criticisms appear to be that the author be-
came too emotionally close to her subjects and too credulous regarding their assertions 
of police misconduct; one reviewer went so far as to suggest that she had committed a 
felony by accompanying one of her subjects on a car ride with the intent of taking re-
venge for another subject’s murder.  My instinct is that her real crime was admitting 
that she, an upscale white woman, had feelings for one or more poor African-
American males—something no less threatening to liberal whites than to law-and-
order conservatives, and perhaps more so—but I am not a sociologist and I am in no 
position to judge her.  
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phenomenon suggests the continuing absence of racial equality and 
supports the case for compensation.   For example, Ta-Nehisi Coates, 
in his Atlantic article, refers repeatedly to ongoing injustices in mak-
ing the moral argument for a reparations program.  These injustices 
include not only mass incarceration and police violence, but numer-
ous other forms of economic, social, and cultural discrimination. 
  The continuing nature of discrimination, however, complicates 
the issue in many ways.    Reparation payments are based on the as-
sumption of a measurable wrong at some identifiable point in the past 
for which the victim is to receive compensation.   If the wrong con-
tinues to accumulate while payments are made, it is at the very least 
more difficult to determine the amount of the payments, and at its 
worst actively hypocritical to do since the perpetrators would be 
compensating wrongful behavior in the past while continuing to en-
gage in the same or similar conduct simultaneously.   Of course, repa-
ration advocates don’t intend for this to occur, instead they wish to 
end wrongful behavior and pay compensation concurrently.   But this 
is asking for a great deal, very quickly. It would seem a higher priori-
ty to end current mistreatment rather than to compensate past wrongs, 
a situation that may account for the tepid support the reparation 
movement has received in the African-American community. 
 Continuing injustice also has troublesome political implica-
tions. Most Americans are probably willing to admit that slavery, Jim 
Crow, and other manifestations of outright segregation were unjusti-
fied. However, Alexander and Goffman are asking them to admit that 
the current generation of Americans—i.e., the same people who 
would make reparation payments—are themselves guilty of oppres-
sion and not much better, and in some cases worse, than previous 
generations.   That’s one reason that people have attacked them so 
forcefully.    For good measure, they are suggesting—Alexander ex-
plicitly, Goffman by implication—that white liberals and the black 
middle class are, to a significant degree, complicit in the problem.    
This suggests that a long and difficult debate will be required to solve 
the problem, and that reparations may not be the only or even the best 
solution. 
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IV. Restorative justice and the South African model 
The factors that complicate reparations in the United States—
continuing discrimination, legal and political resistance, problems in 
identifying victims and computing correct payments—are by no 
means limited to this country.  To some degree, they arise in all cases 
that involve major human rights violations and subsequent demands 
for compensation.  There is also a widespread sentiment that tradi-
tional legal remedies—criminal prosecution, restitution of lost or sto-
len property, and reparations for broader economic losses—are inad-
equate to the task of compensating such vast losses.   In particular, 
there is a concern that traditional remedies provide only a limited role 
for the victims and their families, and make political reconciliation 
and emotional “closure” more difficult than they ought to be. 
Given these limitations, and the practical difficulty in pursuing 
traditional remedies, the concept of restorative justice has gained 
traction in human rights circles.  As compared to traditional remedies, 
which emphasize the search for truth, restorative justice stresses the 
role of the victims and the importance of an encounter between vic-
tim and perpetrator, in an effort to repair the harm caused by the be-
havior in question.   In practice, this requires the utilization of alter-
nate methods, such as a formal apology, truth or fact-finding 
commissions, educational and cultural programs as a substitute or (in 
some cases) a supplement to standard legal procedures.    Restorative 
justice originated as a theory of domestic criminal law, but it has 
found especially fertile ground in the human rights arena for the rea-
sons described above.31  
One of the leading theorists of restorative justice, particularly at 
the international level, is Elazar Barkan, who has addressed the issue 
in a number of works over the past fifteen years.   In The Guilt of Na-
tions: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices Barkan argues 
that restitution for large-scale human rights violations (note that he 
 
 31. The literature on restorative justice is large and growing, although the number of influ-
ential texts remains small.  Supra note 19-23.  The term “transitional justice” is often 
used together with restorative justice but it has a more specific meaning, referring to 
judicial or other proceedings following a change in governments and/or major histori-
cal wrongs: transitional remedies are often restorative in nature but may not always be 
so.  See generally RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000), See also 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 
(Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995). 
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never uses the term “restoration”) should be understood to include 
apology and other non-monetary compensation as well as traditional 
legal measures.  
Barkan further argues that this approach is both practical and 
philosophically appropriate, given the broader transition from an in-
dividualistic, modern consciousness to a more group-oriented, post-
modern worldview.32   In a later collection, Taking Wrongs Seriously: 
Apologies and Reconciliation Barkan and his co-editor, Alexander 
Karn, present a collection of case studies ranging from Vichy, France 
to Australia, evaluating the successes and failures of the apology ap-
proach. Interestingly, the collection includes at least one case (Abu 
Ghraib) in which there has been no apology and considers what the 
consequences of that refusal might be.33   
Another important contributor is Gerry Johnstone, an English 
law professor whose two collections, A Handbook of Redistributive 
Justice, co-edited with Daniel W. Van Ness, and A Restorative Jus-
tice Reader, have served as important source materials for the re-
storative justice movement.   Johnstone is concerned with restorative 
justice in a domestic criminal law context as well as for major atroci-
ties. Johnstone sees it as a new paradigm— “repair” rather than “re-
venge,” as one selection puts it—rather than a fallback when tradi-
tional remedies fail. The emphasis on victim participation and 
dialogue between perpetrators and victims, as well as the effort to re-
store wrongly acquired property, are constant themes in Johnstone’s 
work.34 
Martha Minow, a law professor and later Dean of Harvard Law 
School, approaches the subject with a more nuanced view.   Minow’s 
book, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After 
Genocide and Mass Violence, evaluates a range of responses to atroc-
ity including trials, truth commissions, and financial reparations, ar-
 
 32. ELAZAR BARKAN, THE GUILT OF NATIONS: RESTITUTION AND NEGOTIATING HISTORICAL 
INJUSTICES W.W NORTON, INC. (2000) (hereinafter Barkan I). 
 33. ELAZAR BARKAN & ALEXANDER KARN, TAKING WRONGS SERIOUSLY: APOLOGIES AND 
RECONCILIATION W.W. NORTON, INC.  (2006) (hereinafter Barkan II). 
 34. GERRY JOHNSTONE & DAVID W. VAN NESS (eds.), A HANDBOOK OF RESTORATIVE 
JUSTICE WILLIAN PUBLISHING (2007); (Gerry Johnstone ed., 2006), A RESTORATIVE 
JUSTICE READER WILLIAN PUBLISHING (2d ed. 2013). 
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guing that various combinations of these responses may be appropri-
ate in different circumstances.35  
Minow suggests considering a number of factors, including: the 
population distribution in the country in question the length of time 
since the atrocity took place, the role of international organizations, 
and whether the regime that perpetrated the injustice remains in pow-
er or has been replaced by a different government. Interestingly, Mi-
now considers commemorations and other displays of public memory 
such as museums and monuments as part of the reconciliation process 
along with more conventional remedies, using the American Civil 
War (and in particular the treatment of Black Union soldiers) as an 
example.36 
The restorative justice movement has also touched the slavery 
reparations debate, most prominently in the work of Roy L Brooks, 
whose book “Atonement and Forgiveness: A New Model for Black 
Reparations” proposes a mixture of apology, reconciliation, and more 
traditional remedies as a means of providing redress to Black Ameri-
cans.   While viewing reparations as a moral imperative, Brooks is 
willing to consider a mix of remedies both for practical reasons and 
to encourage an ongoing discussion among the affected groups.  An 
earlier collection edited by Brooks, with the provocative title “When 
Sorry Isn’t Enough,” addressed the issue of non-economic compensa-
tion in a variety of historical contexts.37   
Everyone’s favorite example of restorative justice is South Afri-
ca, which empaneled the so-called Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission (TRC) to deal with the transition from apartheid to post-
apartheid eras.   The essential concept of the TRC was that, in return 
for accurate and complete testimony regarding the abuses of the 
 
 35. MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER 
GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE BEACON PRESS (1998). The author picks up on similar 
themes, including additional historical studies in: BREAKING THE CYCLES OF 
HATRED: MEMORY LAW AND REPAIR (Martha Minow & Nancy L. Rosenblum eds., 
2002). 
 36. Id. at 118-48. See also, DREW GILPIN FAUST, THIS REPUBLIC OF SUFFERING: DEATH AND 
THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR KNOPF (2001) This text provides an extensive discussion of 
the role of monuments in constructing historical memory.  
 37. Roy L. Brooks (ed.), WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH: THE CONTROVERSY OVER 
APOLOGIES AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN INJUSTICE (1999). See also, ROY L. 
BROOKS, ATONEMENT AND FORGIVENESS: A NEW MODEL FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 
(2004). 
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apartheid era, the perpetrators would be granted amnesty from crimi-
nal prosecution.  This system was intended to emphasize national 
reconciliation rather than vengeance and, not entirely coincidentally, 
provide the victims of apartheid with an active, prominent role that 
might have been missing in a more conventional approach.38       
The South African example was indeed inspiring, and the TRC 
functioned better than many observers expected.   But the example is 
more ambiguous than it first appears.  For one thing, the goals of 
“truth” and reconciliation are often conflicted: the very name of the 
commission was a compromise between two conflicting and at times 
contradictory objectives.   A number of victims and the families of 
murdered victims were left unconvinced that justice had been done, 
all while some of the more flagrant perpetrators refused to cooperate 
with the commission.39 
Second, the TRC was only one part—albeit an important part--of 
the South African transition.   The central goal of the transition was, 
of course, the unfettered end of apartheid itself, and the institution of 
a new political system designed to prevent its recurrence.   For exam-
ple, the new constitution enshrined the right of affirmative action as a 
way of undoing part of the damage of the apartheid era. South Afri-
cans, however, are still debating whether these changes were suffi-
cient, and whether some form of reparations should be paid to the 
victims of apartheid, as well.40 
Finally, to the extent the TRC did succeed, the special features of 
South Africa must be taken into account.  These features include: the 
Mandela Government, which emphasized reconciliation over re-
venge, the economic structure of the country, which made it impera-
tive to ensure a minimum of good will in the white population, and 
the nearly universal discrediting of apartheid, both within the country 
and in the world at large. Truth commissions and similar approaches 
 
 38. Transcripts of TRC Proceedings (2009) http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/. 
 39. For an evaluation of the TRC see, e.g., ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTRY UNMASKED: INSIDE 
SOUTH AFRICA’S TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (2001); RICHARD A. 
WILSON, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: 
LEGITIMIZING THE POST-APARTHEID STATE (2001). 
 40. The South African Constitution, like that of India, includes a section specifically al-
lowing affirmative action to address the consequences of past injustice.  S.AFR. 
CONST. 1996, s. 9. 
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have been attempted in a number of other locations, most recently in 
Canada, with largely mixed results.41 
One reason some Americans like the South African parallel is 
that it appears to be dealing with the same issue, i.e. racial segrega-
tion, which they face at home.  Like similar comparisons, this ideal is 
only partially true.   While there are many common features between 
South African apartheid and the segregation of black and white 
Americans, there are also substantial differences.   Perhaps the most 
insurmountable difference is the question of continuity.  Since at least 
1865, there are no events in the American experience to compare 
with the collapse of apartheid and its replacement of a new political 
system.   Americans, or in any event, white Americans, are more like-
ly than South Africans to believe that their racial problems can be 
solved by the existing political and legal process without so called 
extraordinary measures, like special commissions or reparations.  For 
their part, blacks may be suspicious that talk of reconciliation is a 
scapegoat for substantive inaction.  This does not mean there is noth-
ing to be learned from South Africa; only that one must be careful 
about applying the South Africa’s lessons to a uniquely different situ-
ation. 
 
V. Alien but familiar: accounting for the “excesses” of Stalin and 
Mao 
 The preceding sections suggest that foreign precedents must be 
approached with care.  The European Holocaust, perpetrated under 
Nazi Germany’s regime was defeated, occupied, and thoroughly dis-
credited on a political and ideological level.   Similarly, South Afri-
ca’s apartheid ultimately resulted in a peaceful transition, but the 
apartheid regime has become an international pariah and ideological-
ly exhausted.  By contrast, the United States remains a strong, inde-
pendent country with a great deal (some might say too much of) pride 
and rhetoric of innocence regarding racial issues.    It is inherently 
difficult for many Americans to accept that their behavior has much 
in common with that of pariah nations.  One can finesse this issue by 
noting that the Confederacy was defeated and occupied, but this de-
 
 41. See CALLING POWER TO ACCOUNT: LAW, REPARATIONS, AND THE CHINESE CANADIAN 
HEAD TAX CASE (Mayo Moran & David Dyzenhaus eds., 2005).   
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duction is a bit too clever. The Southern states were quickly readmit-
ted to the Union after the end of the Civil War, and racism has long 
been recognized as a national problem in the United States. 
 One interesting if unhappy precedent comes from a somewhat 
unlikely source.  When the Soviet Union experienced glasnost and 
perestroika in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s, Russian citizens learned 
what many foreigners already knew: the country had experienced 
massive human rights catastrophes during the period of Joseph Sta-
lin’s rule (1924-1953) and to a significant degree before and after. 
These atrocities included the death of at least five million people in 
the artificial famines, accompanying the forced collectivization of ag-
riculture (1929-1933); several million more deaths in the so-called 
Great Purge (1936-38); and numerous others in the vast gulag (pris-
on) system, culminating in the death of nearly fifteen million people. 
What, if anything, should be done to compensate Russian citizens, or 
at least account for their losses? 
 The most systematic description of Stalin’s crimes is detailed 
in two books by Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet 
Collectivization and the Terror-Famine (1986) and The Great Ter-
ror: Stalin’s Purge of the Thirties, which was originally published in 
1968, and substantially revised in a 40th anniversary edition, The 
Great Terror: A Reassessment in 1990, that includes a lengthy new 
forward in 2007.  These books are significant because they establish, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, two points. One, that a vast number of 
human beings, almost certainly more than 10 million, were killed in 
one manner or another. Secondly, Stalin had direct personal 
knowledge that the events occurred, and either continued the relevant 
policy anyway (in the case of the famine) or continued to seek out 
more victims (in the case of the Great Purge).   
The 1990 and 2008 editions of The Great Terror are integral be-
cause a substantial number of new archives have been opened in the 
period since the original edition was published. Not only do these 
new materials support Conquest’s thesis, but some cases suggest that 
circumstances were even worse than the author had presented. A ra-
ther feisty character and distinguished poet, Conquest died recently at 
98. Conquest, not bashful about pointing out his opponents’ errors, 
expressed in the preface to the 40th Anniversary Edition of his book, 
that an alternate title for the book might have been: “I told you so, 
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you . . . fools!”  although he subsequently admitted that this was not 
his own idea.42 
 Conquest is not alone in addressing the Stalin era, and there 
continues to be extensive debate regarding the purges and other mat-
ters, although the degree of the tragedy is no longer in serious doubt.  
The most recent articulation is Stephen Kotkin’s book, Stalin, a three-
volume set of which the first volume, Paradoxes of Power: 1878-
1928, was published in 2014. Kotkin’s book covers only the first part 
of Stalin’s career, ending with the onset of collectivization.   Howev-
er, the book is significant because it makes clear the author’s belief 
that Stalin’s policies cannot be attributed solely to personality flaws, 
but resulted in large part from ideology. The book also argues that 
Stalin’s policies were different in degree, but not in nature, from pol-
icies pursued by Lenin and other Soviet leaders before Stalin came to 
power.  Indeed, in perhaps his most noteworthy chapter, Kotkin ar-
gues that Lenin’s supposed testament, in which he noted Stalin’s ex-
treme tendencies and warned against making him leader, may have 
been a forgery and was, in any case, not indicative of the author’s ac-
tual views.   This point, and the broader continuity of Soviet policy, 
both before and after the Stalin era, is enormously important for his 
historical legacy, as we will observe.43    
 During the Khrushchev period (1953-1964), and more exten-
sively the Gorbachev period (1985-1991), the excesses of the Stalin 
Era began to come to light, although there was a strong tendency to 
attribute these to Stalin’s personal flaws--the so-called “cult of per-
sonality”—rather than to the underlying political system or to Lenin, 
who remained unassailable in the Soviet world.  In progressive cir-
 
 42. See generally ROBERT CONQUEST, THE HARVEST OF SORROW: SOVIET 
COLLECTIVIZATION AND THE TERROR-FAMINE (1986); ROBERT CONQUEST, THE GREAT 
TERROR: STALIN’S PURGE OF THE THIRTIES (1968); ROBERT CONQUEST, THE GREAT 
TERROR: A REASSESSMENT (40th Anniversary Ed. 2007).  For a recent work discussing 
Hitler and Stalin in a comparative perspective, see TIMOTHY SNYDER, BLOODLANDS: 
EUROPE BETWEEN HITLER AND STALIN (2010).  For an alternate view of the purges, 
savaged by Conquest in his later editions, see J. ARCH GETTY, ORIGINS OF THE GREAT 
PURGES: THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY RECONSIDERED, 1933-1938 (1987). 
 43. STEPHEN KOTKIN, STALIN (VOLUME I): PARADOXES OF POWER, 1878-1928 (2014).  
Kotkin, who it seems fair to call a prolific scholar, has also published an in-depth 
study of Stalinism as experienced in one city and a book on the collapse of Soviet 
communism a generation after Stalin’s death.  STEPHEN KOTKIN, MAGNETIC 
MOUNTAIN: STALINISM AS A CIVILIZATION (1995); STEPHEN KOTKIN, ARMAGEDDON 
AVERTED: THE SOVIET COLLAPSE, 1970-2000 (2001). 
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cles, there was a feeling that some type of amends should be made, a 
feeling which became stronger after the Soviet Union collapsed in 
1991 and even more evidence became available.  But what form 
should these amends take—reparations, apology, a full historical ac-
counting--and how could they take place at all without calling in to 
question the legitimacy of the Soviet Union or Russia as its successor 
thereafter? 
 The Russian story is not a happy one, and provides a sober 
counterpoint to the South African experience.  In Russia, a Law on 
the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression was passed in 
1991, including limited reparation provisions, followed by the so-
called trial of the Communist Party, which in theory found the party 
to be a criminal organization and barred its re-constitution in the Rus-
sian Federation.  These official activities were supplemented by the 
work of Memorial and other NGOs, whom gathered evidence, con-
structed memorials, and generally attempted to bring the issue to the 
forefront of political consciousness.   Following the ascension to 
power of Vladimir Putin, however, these efforts were slowed or 
abandoned: indeed, there has been legal, political, and at times physi-
cal pressure placed on Memorial to discontinue its activities, fre-
quently coupled with the assertion that critics of the regime are col-
laborating with the country’s enemies.  A narrative has emerged—or 
perhaps re-emerged—that the excesses, if any, of previous eras were 
a necessary step in the emergence of the Soviet Union as a world 
power, and questioning this narrative has, in recent years, been tan-
tamount to treason. 44 
 It must be emphasized that Russia is hardly alone in its reti-
cence regarding past abuses.   China, which in theory remains a 
Communist state, has been less than forthcoming.  Thus, while there 
have been scattered apologies for individual behavior during the pe-
riod of the Cultural Revolution (wen hua da ge ming) (1966-1976) 
and, to a lesser extent, Great Leap Forward (da yue jin) (1958-1961), 
there has been no public acknowledgment of responsibility, let alone 
an apology, compensation, or similar behavior, elicited from the Chi-
nese government. Indeed, under Xi Jinping, China appears to be 
moving in a more authoritarian direction, with nationalism on the up-
swing and the cult of Mao Zedong remaining vibrant at the popular 
 
 44. See Infra note 46.  
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level.   This is notwithstanding an estimated 20 million plus deaths 
during the Great Leap Forward and the near-total destruction of soci-
ety in the Cultural Revolution period. While it is possible that the fu-
ture will bring a change in attitudes, there is little sign of change as of 
now. 
 The Russian and Chinese experiences suggest there is nothing 
inevitable about a country confronting the more painful aspects of its 
history. In addition, the Russian case illustrates that efforts to do so 
may indeed provoke a reaction that pushes the country in an opposite 
direction. This is especially true when such efforts are made without 
a secure political foundation and a broad consensus that an account-
ing is justified.   To be sure, the undemocratic nature of the Putin and 
Xi Governments, and the unique features of Russia and China gener-
ally, make any comparison difficult.   It is perhaps best to think of 
these examples, not as precluding the possibility of restorative justice 
or some other form of justice, but as cautionary tales suggesting one 
should proceed carefully in its obtainment. 
 
 
VI. Reparation and Restoration: Applying the Lessons of History 
in a Domestic Context 
 Applying the lessons of history is always a risky business.  In 
the pages above, we can find examples of traditional justice (the early 
approach to the Holocaust), restorative justice (South Africa), and a 
mix of the two approaches (as in Rwanda or some of the more recent 
Holocaust initiatives).  We can also find examples, like post-Soviet 
Russia, where no effort, as of yet, has succeeded, at all.  Some schol-
ars consider the problem of transitional justice following regime 
changes to constitute its own separate subject matter, although others 
have cast doubt on this approach. 
 While it is difficult to learn from history, it is not impossible. 
Three lessons in particular stand out from this study.  They concern, 
in no particular order, (i) the uncertain boundary between traditional 
and restorative justice, (ii) the need to design remedies that are ap-
propriate for the country and people concerned, and (iii) the necessity 
of political consensus for any approach to succeed. Together they 
point in a different direction than that identified by most previous 
scholars. I consider these items in turn. 
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VII. Traditional and restorative justice: an uncertain boundary. 
While scholars like to classify different procedures, in practice 
there is no clear line between restorative justice and other more tradi-
tional modes.  The Holocaust is perhaps the best example of this phe-
nomenon.  While the Nuremberg and Eichmann Trials were an ex-
ample of traditional, retributive justice, the Holocaust has also given 
rise to numerous apologies, truth, or fact-finding commissions (nota-
bly in France and Italy), and cultural activities, (museums, education-
al programs, etc.) that suggest a restorative approach.    
South Africa, while emphasizing restoration, is also debating the 
payment of reparations, a more traditional remedy.   The very name 
of the South African commission appears to have been a compromise 
between those who wished to emphasize truth (a more traditional ob-
jective) and those preferring reconciliation (a largely restorative as-
pect).  Reparations themselves have a compensatory but also restora-
tive aspect, particularly when they take the form of credits which 
encourage contacts between the perpetrator and victim groups. 
 Although there is no clear line between remedies, there is a dif-
ference in emphasis.   Thus, allowing for some inevitable overlap, it 
seems fair to say that certain countries, including but not limited to, 
South Africa lean toward a restorative approach, while others empha-
size traditional remedies.  From this perspective, it is interesting that 
the American debate has, with notable exceptions, taken a by and 
large traditional approach, with both sides assuming that the alterna-
tives are payment or non-payment of reparations, rather than a third, 
restorative alternative. The debate has similarly emphasized a rheto-
ric of guilt and innocence—the kind one would expect in a criminal 
trial or a civil tort litigation—rather than an effort to find common 
ground between the two parties.  Of course, there have been numer-
ous efforts to improve race relations outside the reparations context: 
affirmative action/diversity efforts are one, although by no means the 
only example.   But it is noteworthy that the American discussion, 
rhetorically speaking, remains frozen in a rather traditional matrix; 
this may account in part for the failure of the reparations movement 
to achieve more than it has thus far. 
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VIII. The need to design fact-specific remedies 
 If different countries have taken opposing approaches to the 
reparations problem, this results not only from philosophical differ-
ences, but contrasting fact situations. The Holocaust involved a de-
feated power (Nazi Germany) that had been defeated, at least in part, 
because of its habit of launching aggressive wars and murdering sub-
stantial parts of neighboring populations. The Jews constituted a mi-
nority, although by no means an insignificant minority, of the coun-
try’s victims.  This situation plainly called for the punishment of at 
least the top Nazi officials, and the payment of some kind of indem-
nity before restorative measures could be contemplated.   By contrast, 
South Africa involved a negotiated transfer of power from the white 
minority to the majority population, which might not have been pos-
sible had the former been treated in the manner of a defeated adver-
sary rather than a political partner.   Although the choices made were 
by no means inevitable, these situations plainly called for two differ-
ent approaches. 
 Historical situations diverge, not only in political circumstanc-
es, but in their susceptibility to legal remedies.  The internment of 
Japanese Americans during World War II was an unquestioned out-
rage, which almost no one would justify today. But by the 1980s the 
outrage quelled, and people of Japanese descent were reasonably well 
integrated into American society.  In this situation, the payment of 
reparations, coupled with a sincere if rather belated apology, was an 
acceptable and a bittersweet solution for both sides.45  By contrast, 
the mistreatment of African-Americans—somewhat akin to the re-
pression of dissident groups in the Soviet Union or China—is an on-
going phenomenon that, many believe, is inherent in the country’s 
present day institutions and behavior patterns.   This latter situation is 
 
 45. For an overall history of the Japanese-American internments see RICHARD REEVES, 
INFAMY: THE SHOCKING STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT IN WORLD 
WAR II (2015).  For a scholarly treatment of the internment and the (much later) repa-
rations process, see ERIC K. YAMAMOTO AND MARGARET CHON, RACE RIGHTS AND 
REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICA INTERNMENT (2001).The pain inflicted 
by the internment of Japanese Americans never really touched the author until—on a 
visit to the Museum of Tolerance— he chanced upon a coffee shop in West Los Ange-
les in a neighborhood that was obviously different from those surrounding it.  A walk 
around the block revealed a large number of Japanese-American historical references 
but relatively few current Japanese residents.  It didn’t take long to figure out what had 
happened.   
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more difficult to resolve with a one-time monetary payment, or at 
very least requires a long and painful discussion before such a pay-
ment can be made. 
 There is a perverse element here, in that traditional legal reme-
dies are most effective when an offense is securely in the past and the 
government or institutions that put it into effect are no longer in ex-
istence.  Yet this is an unavoidable tension in the reparations problem 
and perhaps law itself.   We will have occasion to revisit this issue in 
our concluding section. 
 
IX. The necessity of political consensus 
Perhaps the most transparent lesson of this study is the need for 
broad political agreement before embarking upon remedies, restora-
tive or otherwise, for human rights abuses.  This is especially true 
when the abuse complained of is of a recent or continuing nature and 
there is no substantial discontinuity—military defeat, change of re-
gime, etc.—in governing structures. If there was a mistake in Russia, 
it consisted in advancing an agenda of rehabilitation, reparation, and 
apology before the larger population had come to recognize the evils 
in the country’s past and its own complicity in them.   A similar line 
separates the Federal Republic of Germany, which has for three gen-
erations tried to educate its citizens regarding the country’s responsi-
bility for the Holocaust and World War II. This is unlike other re-
gions like Austria, the former East Germany, and arguably Japan 
whom have made less substantial efforts in this area.  Not surprising-
ly, reparations or other remedies proved more difficult to achieve in 
the aforementioned regions. 
 
X. Proposals and Recommendations 
How does the U.S fit into the matrix set out above?  The Ameri-
can debate has gone on for more than a generation and, with a few 
exceptions, has been conducted in traditional, rather than restorative, 
terms.   The harm to African-Americans appears to be of an ongoing 
nature, although it is arguably less intense than in the slavery or Jim 
Crow eras.   There is little political consensus regarding reparation 
payments, and it is possible that the two sides are diverging rather 
than converging, a situation compounded by the ongoing polarization 
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of the broader political system, both within and between the two ma-
jor United States political parties.  
 These factors suggest that the U.S. could benefit, at least in the 
short term by shifting from a retributive approach to a more restora-
tive approach.  Undertaking this shift is a difficult proposition, out-
lined below. 
 
XI. Suggestions 
First, Congress and the President should convene a blue-ribbon 
commission, involving prominent figures, and having appropriate 
subpoena powers, to create an official, systematic record of harm 
done to African-Americans by slavery, Jim Crow, and subsequent 
discrimination and publish that record as an official document.   Like 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, the goal of 
this commission would be not to punish individuals or to impose fi-
nancial penalties, but to create a full and complete factual record that 
precludes anyone in the future from denying that these events took 
place.  The role of national institutions—banks, commercial enter-
prises, the Federal Government itself and the questions of continuing, 
as well as, past harm would be a specific focus of these hearings.  
The national commission would, ideally, be paralleled by smaller 
commissions that would conduct equivalent work in all fifty states, 
using the work of the national commission as a starting point. 
Second, upon completion of its work, the commission should is-
sue an unconditional apology for slavery and subsequent discrimina-
tion against African-Americans. Apologies of this nature are easy to 
minimize, but they carry significant moral weight and are frequently 
a prerequisite for more substantive steps.  The United States Con-
gress passed a resolution apologizing for slavery in 200946, but it re-
ceived very little attention and it was not accompanied by any sub-
stantive actions. 
 Finally, upon completion of its work, the commission should 
recommend specific actions designed to compensate African-
Africans for past injustices and prevent their recurrence in the future.  
Initially these might emphasize educational and cultural activities, 
 
 46. Senate Apology For Slavery Gets Mixed Reaction, NPR, (June 24, 2009), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=105850676. 
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such as a national curriculum on the accurate history of slavery and 
discrimination, or more funds allocated to African-American muse-
ums and Historically Black Colleges and Universities (“HBCU’s”).   
Activities like this have been undertaken in the past, but usually on a 
state or local level as opposed to the national stage, and rarely with 
this sort of official sanction. 
At a later stage the commission’s recommendations might in-
clude some form of symbolic reparations, payable either to individual 
African-Americans or (more likely) to representative community in-
stitutions, as a way of closing the book on slavery and signifying a 
commitment that neither slavery nor its moral equivalent will return.  
Issues like affirmative action or government set-asides might also be 
raised, although these would require separate legislation at a federal 
or state level, and because reparation/restitution is only one of many 
arguments to be made.   As with all legislation, those who oppose, as 
well as those who support them would be afforded a chance to testify.  
But all this would come at the end of the process rather than the be-
ginning, and only at such point, if any, at which a national consensus 
had been created regarding the validity of such activities and the his-
torical record that supported them.  This is the inverse of the current 
situation, in which specific proposals are debated in the absence of a 
genuine political and moral consensus and a situation that foreign ex-
perience teaches us is a recipe for failure. 
I recognize that this proposal is likely to satisfy no one: too little 
for those who want immediate reparations, and too much for those 
who oppose them.   But proposals must be evaluated against the 
background of likely alternatives. Right now, the reparations debate 
is stalled in the first gear, generating controversy rather than conver-
sation and increasingly distant from the reality of present-day race re-
lations.  A restorative approach is both more consistent with the expe-
rience of comparable countries and, in my judgment, more likely to 
achieve success than the current approach.  Even if it does not suc-
ceed, the process I have suggested will set the table fora candid con-
versation to take place.  The alternative of continued litigation—
literally in the courts and metaphorically in the wider political are-
na—becomes less appealing each day. 
Lawyers like to argue, and we do it very well.  Every once in a 
while, someone has to step back and admit that an issue cannot be re-
solved by progressively cleverer arguments and that a conversation, 
rather than a debate, is what’s needed.  This issue is one of those 
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times.   The conversation has to come sooner or later.   If not now, 
when?   
 
